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A decision is a commitment to a proposition or plan of action based on information and values associated
with the possible outcomes. The process operates in a flexible timeframe that is free from the immediacy
of evidence acquisition and the real time demands of action itself. Thus, it involves deliberation, planning,
and strategizing. This Perspective focuses on perceptual decisionmaking in nonhuman primates and the dis-
covery of neural mechanisms that support accuracy, speed, and confidence in a decision. We suggest that
thesemechanisms expose principles of cognitive function in general, and we speculate about the challenges
and directions before the field.Introduction
The study of decision making occurs within psychology, statis-
tics, economics, finance, engineering (e.g., quality control),
political science, philosophy, medicine, ethics, and jurispru-
dence. The neuroscience behind decision making touches on
only a fraction of these areas, although it is a frequent source
of delight when a connection emerges between neural mecha-
nisms and each of these areas. While decision making, per se,
fascinates, what makes the neuroscience of decision making
special is the insight it promises on a deeper topic. For the
neurobiology of decision making is really the neurobiology of
cognition—or at the very least a large component of cognition
that is tractable to experimental neuroscience. It exposes
principles of neural processing that underlie a variety of mental
functions. Moreover, we believe these same principles,
enumerated below, will furnish critical insight into the patho-
physiology of diseases that compromise cognitive function,
and ultimately they will supply the key to ameliorating cognitive
dysfunction.
For this special issue of Neuron’s 25th anniversary, we focus
on a line of research that began almost exactly 25 years ago,
in the laboratory of Bill Newsome. It is an honor to share our
perspective on the field: its roots, an overview of the progress
we have made, and some ideas about some of the directions
we might pursue in the next 25 years.
From Perception to Decision Making
Approximately 25 years ago, Bill Newsome, Ken Britten, and
Tony Movshon recorded from neurons in extrastriate area MT/
V5 of rhesus monkeys while those monkeys performed a
demanding direction discrimination task. They made two impor-
tant discoveries. First, the fidelity of the single-neuron response
to motion rivaled the fidelity of the monkey’s behavioral reports,
in other words, choice accuracy. The fidelity of a neural response
is a characterization of the relationship between its signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) and the stimulus difficulty level. Second, the
trial-to-trial variability of single neurons—the noise part of ‘‘signal
to noise’’—exhibited a weak but reliable correlation with the trial-
to-trial variability of the monkey’s choices (Newsome et al.,
1989a, 1989b; Britten et al., 1996).These two observations seemed to imply that the monkey
was basing decisions either on a small number of neurons or,
more likely, a large number of neurons that share a portion of
their variability. Shared variability, termed noise correlation, cur-
tails the expected improvement in performance one would
expect from signal averaging (Box 1). Recall that the SNR of
an average will improve by the square root of the number of in-
dependent samples. However, if the noise is not independent
but instead characterized by weak positive correlation, then
the improvement in SNR approaches asymptotic levels at
50–100 samples, beyond which more samples fail to improve
matters. The levels of correlation seen in pairs of neurons
(nearby neurons that carry similar signals, that is to say, neurons
that one would imagine ought to be averaged) would limit the
improvement in SNR to 2.5 to 3-fold compared to a single
neuron (Zohary et al., 1994).
This simple insight goes a long way toward explaining why sin-
gle neurons can rival a well-trainedmonkey andwhy the variation
from just one neuron (out of the many that could have been
sampled) would exhibit any covariation with the trial-to-trial vari-
ation in the monkey’s responses (Shadlen et al., 1996; Shadlen
and Newsome, 1998).
Signal Detection Theory
The quantitative study of perception, or psychophysics, has
embraced decision theory since its inception by Fechner (Smith,
1994). The focus of psychophysics is to infer from choice
behavior (e.g., present/absent, more/less, left/right) properties
of the sensory ‘‘evidence.’’ How does SNR scale with contrast
or other physical properties of the stimulus? Which stimulus fea-
tures interfere with each other? This inference relies on a deci-
sion stage that connects the representation of the evidence to
the subject’s choice (Figure 1A). The success of psychophysics
and the reason it remains such an influential platform for the
study of decision making is that this decision stage facilitated
rigorous predictions. This is exemplified by the application of
signal detection theory (SDT) to perception (Green and Swets,
1966). We should remind ourselves of this standard as neurosci-
ence moves past the representation of evidence to the study of
the decision process itself.Neuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 791
Box 1. Noise
One might wonder why the brain would allow for such
inefficiency. There are two answers, which stem from a
deeper truth. First, it probably can’t be helped. To build
responses that are similar enough to be worthy of averaging,
it may be impossible to avoid sharing inputs, and this
leads inevitably to weak noise correlation. Second, the real
benefit of averaging is to achieve a fast representation of
firing rate. A neuron that is receiving a signal should not
have to wait for many spikes to arrive in order to sense
the intensity of the signal it is receiving. Thus it samples
from a pool of many neurons, and the density of spikes
across the pool furnishes a near-instantaneous estimate
of spike rate. So the deeper truth is that neurons in cortex
do not compute with spikes but with spike rate. Moreover,
it is this need for many neurons to represent spike rate in a
fraction of the interval between the spikes of any one neuron
that leads to this particular form of redundancy and the
surfeit of excitation it would bring to a target cell were the
excitation not balanced by inhibition. It is from this insight
that the essential role of balanced E/I in cortical neural cir-
cuits arises. E/I balance in the high-input regime is what
makes neurons noisy in the first place (Shadlen and News-
ome, 1994, 1998), and it requires fine tuning since it must
be maintained over the range of cortical spike rates,
throughout which the spike intervals scale but the time con-
stants of neurons do not. Together, this argument explains
why E/I balance is such a general principle and perhaps
why it seems to be implicated in many disorders affecting
higher brain function.
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so-called ‘‘high-threshold theory,’’ which explained error rates
as guesses arising from a failure of a weak signal to surpass
a threshold. SDT replaced the threshold with a flexible criterion
and this gave a more parsimonious theory of error rates—one
that is consilient with neuroscience. By inducing changes in
the criterion or setting up the experiment to test in a ‘‘crite-
rion-free’’ way, it became clear that errors do not arise because
a signal did not make it past some threshold of activation. The
signal (and noise) is available to the decision stage; it is only a
matter of adjusting the criterion.
There is a larger point to bemade about SDT that distinguishes
it from many other popular mathematical frameworks. It spec-
ifies how a single observation leads to a single response. Other
popular frameworks (e.g., information theory, game theory,
and probabilistic classification) can explain ensemble behavior
captured by psychometric functions (e.g., proportion correct
over many trials), but they provide less satisfying accounts of
the decision process on single trials (DeWeese and Meister,
1999; Laming, 1968). Often they presume that single trials
are random realizations of the probabilities captured by the
ensemble choice frequencies (see Value-Based and Social
Decisions, below). This presumption is antithetical to SDT, which
explains variability of choice using a deterministic decision rule
applied to noisy evidence.792 Neuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.From Evidence to Decision Variable
In SDT, there is a notion that the raw representation of evidence
gives rise to a so-called decision variable (DV), upon which the
brain applies a ‘‘decision rule’’ to say yes/no, more/less, or cate-
gory A/B. In classic SDT, the DV is a simple transformation of the
sensory data that satisfies the weak constraint that it be mono-
tonically related to likelihood (the probability of observing this
value given a state of the world, such as rightward), and the
decision rule is effectively a comparison to a criterion.
For the motion task, the original idea put forth by Newsome,
Britten, and Movshon (Newsome et al., 1989a) was that the
decision is based on a comparison of the spike counts from a
pair of neurons that are most sensitive to the two directions of
motion (Figure 1B). This is equivalent to saying that the DV
is the difference in the spike counts and the criterion is at
DV = 0 (Figure 1C). There are several implicit assumptions. The
monkey knows which neurons to monitor and counts all the
spikes from these neurons while the stimulus (random dot
motion, RDM) is shown. Moreover, the responses of a neuron
to motion in its antipreferred direction are a proxy for the re-
sponses of another ‘‘antineuron’’ to motion in its preferred direc-
tion. These assumptions were later amended to replace the
neuron-antineuron pair with pools of noisy, weakly correlated
neurons (Britten et al., 1992) and to restrict the epoch of spike
counting to shorter epochs than the entire duration of the stim-
ulus (Kiani et al., 2008; Mazurek et al., 2003). Nonetheless, the
idea remained that the DV can be inferred from recordings of a
single neuron whose direction preference (and receptive field)
are suited to the discriminandum.
The main transformations from the evidence in MT to the DV
are subtraction (i.e., comparison) and the accumulation of spikes
in time, which we will refer to as integration. Both of these trans-
formations are appealing in principle. Regarding the first, a differ-
ence between two positive random numbers yields a new
random variable that is apt for quantifying degree of belief
(Gold and Shadlen, 2002; Shadlen et al., 2006), as we will explain
later. The appeal of integration is that it implies processing on a
time scale that is liberated from the immediacy of the sensory
events. It underlies the most general feature of cognition.
From SDT to Sequential Analysis
In SDT there is no natural explanation for the amount of time it
takes to complete a decision. This is an extremely important
property of decisions, especially when viewed as a window on
cognition. After all, outside the lab, there is no such thing as a trial
structure. Hence, even the simplest of perceptual decisions pre-
suppose decisions about context, which include whether, when,
and for how long to acquire evidence. There are two ways to
answer the how long question: based on elapsed time itself, as
in a deadline, and based on a level of evidence or certainty.
These are not mutually exclusive.
Even for simple perceptual decisions, evidence may be
acquired over timescales greater than the natural integration
times of sensory receptors. For vision, this would encompass a
decision that extends past 60–100 ms (e.g., the limits of
Bloch’s law; Watson, 1986). In that case, we must countenance
an evolving DV that is updated in time. In many situations,
accumulating samples of evidence—that is, some type of
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Figure 1. Psychophysics and Signal
Detection Theory
(A) Psychophysics deploys simple behavioral
measures of detection, discrimination, and identi-
fication to deduce the conversion of physical
properties of stimuli to signals in low-level pro-
cesses. The approach identifies a decision stage
that connects low-level processors to a behavioral
report. L(x,y,t) represents the pattern of luminance
as a function of space and time. Adapted from
Graham (1989).
(B) Application of signal detection theory to a
direction discrimination task. A weak rightward
motion stimulus gives rise to samples of evidence
from the rightward- and leftward-preferring neu-
rons, respectively, conceived as random draws of
average firing rate from the two pools. The decision
rule is to choose the direction corresponding to the
larger sample of the pair. Most sample pairs will
exhibit the correct sign of the inequality (right
sample > left sample), but the overlap of the dis-
tributions occasionally gives rise to the opposite
inequality, hence an error.
(C) The depiction in (B) can be simplified by sub-
tracting the left sample from the right to construct
a single difference (D) in firing rate. The dis-
tribution has a mean equal to the difference of the two means in (B) and a variance equal to the sum of the two variances. The decision rule is to choose
rightward if D > 0. The error rate is the total probability of D < 0, that is, the area to the left of the criterion line at D = 0.
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that integration is not the only operation that can be used for
decision making. Different operations may be advantageous in
different contexts (e.g., differentiation for a detection task, or
belief propagation for inference about whether two parts of an
object are connected).
Nonetheless, a simple but powerful idea is that in many situa-
tions evidence is accumulated to some threshold level, whence
the decision terminates in a choice, even if provisional (Resulaj
et al., 2009). If the two directions are equally likely (i.e., neutral
prior probability), then we represent the process as an accu-
mulation of signal plus noise to symmetric decision bounds
(Figure 2A). The upper and lower bounds support termination
in favor of a right or left choice, respectively. In the brain, this pro-
cess looks more like a race between two mechanisms, one that
accumulates evidence for right (against left), and the other that
does the opposite (Figure 2B). This detail matters for correspon-
dence with the physiology (Figure 3).
The beauty of this idea is that a single mechanism can thus
account for both which decision is made and how much time
(or howmany samples) it takes to commit to an answer—in other
words, the balance between accuracy and speed. As shown in
Figure 3B the framework is so powerful that one can fit the reac-
tion time data to establish themodel parameters—an estimate of
the bound height and a coefficient that converts motion strength
to units of SNR—and then predict the accuracy at each of the
motion strengths (solid curve, upper graph). This is a rare feat
in psychophysics: to make a set of measurements and to use it
to predict another. It convinced us that there is merit to the
idea (Box 2).
There is another virtue of evidence accumulation that is not yet
widely appreciated. It establishes a mapping between a DV and
the probability that a decisionmade on the basis of this DVwill be
the correct one. Indeed, the brain appears to have implicit knowl-
edge of this mapping, which it uses to assign a sense of certaintyor confidence about the decision. Confidence is crucial for guid-
ing behavior in a complex environment. It affects how we learn
from our mistakes and justify our decisions to others, and it
may be essential when making a decision that depends on a
previous decision whose outcome (e.g., correct or not) is not
yet known.
Until recently confidence has been largely ignored in neurosci-
ence, in large part because it seemed impossible to measure
behaviorally in nonverbal animals. However, introduction of
postdecision wagering has begun to change this (Hampton,
2001; Kepecs et al., 2008; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Kornell
et al., 2007; Middlebrooks and Sommer, 2012; Shields et al.,
1997). The strategy is to allow an animal to opt out of a decision
for a secure but small reward, a ‘‘sure bet.’’ The testable
assertion is that the animal uses this option to indicate lack of
confidence on the main decision. The assertion can be tested
by comparing choice accuracy under two conditions: trials
in which the animal is not given the ‘‘sure bet’’ option and trials
in which the option is available but waived. In both cases the
animal renders a decision. If it takes the sure bet more frequently
when the evidence is less reliable, then it ought to improve its
accuracy on the remaining trials. This prediction has been
confirmed experimentally (Hampton, 2001; Kiani and Shadlen,
2009).
The mapping between the DV and the probability of being cor-
rect explains certainty and provides a unified theory of choice,
reaction time (RT), and confidence. The mapping for the RDM
experiment is shown by the heat map in Figure 2C. This mapping
is more sophisticated than a monotonic function of the amount
of evidence accumulated for the winning option. We think it
also involves two other quantities: the evidence that has been
accumulated for the losing alternatives and the amount of time
that has elapsed, or really the number of samples of evidence.
The first of these was proposed by Vickers to explain the ob-
servation that stimulus difficulty affects confidence even in RTNeuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 793
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Figure 2. Bounded Evidence Accumulation Explains Decision Accuracy, Speed, and Confidence
(A) Drift diffusion with symmetric bounds. Noisy momentary evidence for/against hypotheses h1 and h2 is accumulated (irregular trace) until it reaches an upper or
lower termination bound, leading to a choice in favor of h1 or h2. In themotion task, h1 and h2 are opposite directions (e.g., right and left). Themomentary evidence
is the difference in firing rates between pools of direction-selective neurons that prefer the two directions. At each moment, this difference is a noisy draw from a
Gaussian distribution (inset) with mean proportional to motion strength. The mean difference is the expected drift rate of the diffusion process. The process
reconciles the speed and accuracy of choices with two parameters, bound height (± A) and mean of e. If the stimulus is extinguished before the accumulated
evidence reaches a bound, then the decision is based on the sign of the accumulation.
(B) Competing accumulators. The same mechanism is realized by two accumulators that race. If the evidence for h1 and h2 are opposite, then the race is
mathematically identical to symmetric drift diffusion. The race is a better approximation to the physiology, since there are neurons that represent accumulated
evidence for each of the choices. This mechanism extends to account for choices and RT when there are more than two alternatives. If the stimulus is ex-
tinguished before one of the accumulations reaches a bound, then the decision is based on the accumulator with the larger value (as in Figure 1B).
(C) Certainty. The heat map displays the correspondence between the state of the accumulated evidence in panel (A) and the log of the odds that the decision it
precipitates will be the correct one. The mapping depends on the possible difficulties that might be encountered. This corresponds to the possible motion
strengths in the direction discrimination experiments. The mapping does not depend on presence or shape of the bound. Notice that the same amount of
accumulated evidence supports less certainty as time passes. Cooler colors indicate low certainty (e.g., log odds equal to 0 implies that a correct choice and an
error are equally likely). In the postdecision wagering experiment, the monkey opts out of the discrimination and chooses the sure-but-small reward when the
accumulated evidence is in the low certainty (cooler) region of the map.
Adapted from Gold and Shadlen (2007) and from Kiani and Shadlen (2009).
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were stereotyped at the end of the decision, there would be no
explanation for different levels of confidence. The second,
elapsed time, shapes the monotonic relationship between the
DV and confidence so that the same DV can map to different
degrees of confidence (note the curved iso-certainty contours
in Figure 2C). The intuition is as follows. The reliability of the
evidence is often unknown to the decision maker at the begin-
ning of deliberation (i.e., the first sample of evidence). If time
goes by and the DV has not meandered too far from its origin,
then it is likely that the evidence came from a less reliable source
(e.g., a difficult motion strength). This insight suggests that brain
structures such as orbitofrontal cortex, which represent quanti-
ties dependent on certainty (e.g., expected reward), must have
access to the relevant variables: elapsed decision time, the
DV, and any variables that would corrupt the correspondence
between the DV and accumulated evidence (e.g., the urgency
signal described below).
A Neural Correlate of a Decision Variable
The question is where to look in the brain for a neural correlate of
a decision variable. The main criterion must be the existence of
temporally prolonged responses that are neither purely motor794 Neuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.nor purely sensory but that reveal aspects of both. Other criteria
are access to the motion evidence and access to the oculomo-
tor system (since the animal reports direction with a saccade to
a target), but the responses should outlast the immediate re-
sponses of visual cortical neurons and they cannot precipitate
an eye movement. The lateral intraparietal area (LIP) seemed
an obvious candidate (Shadlen and Newsome, 1996; Glimcher,
2001). LIP was defined as the part of Brodmann area 7 that
projects to brain structures involved in the control of eye move-
ments (Andersen et al., 1990). It receives input from the appro-
priate visual areas and the pulvinar, and its neurons are known
to respond persistently through intervals of up to seconds
when an animal is instructed—but required to withhold—a
saccade to a target (Barash et al., 1991; Gnadt and Andersen,
1988). It seems obvious that one could construct a task like a
delayed eye movement and to substitute a decision about
motion for the instruction. Under this condition, LIP neurons
ought to, at the very least, signal the monkey’s answer in the
delay period after the decision is made. In other words, the neu-
rons should signal the planned saccade to (or away from) the
choice target in its receptive field (RF). That was immediately
confirmed—no surprise, as it was almost guaranteed by target-
ing LIP.
Box 2. The Death and Resurrection of a Theory
Here is a cautionary tale that ought to interest theorists, experimentalists, philosophers, and historians of science. The concept of
bounded evidence integration originated in the field of quality control, which draws on statistical inference from sequential samples
of data. Abraham Wald began this secretly as a way to decide whether batches of munitions were of sufficient quality to ship. He
developed the sequential probability ratio test as the optimal procedure to test a hypothesis against its alternative, using the min-
imal number of samples (effectively a speed versus accuracy tradeoff) (Wald, 1947; Wald and Wolfowitz, 1947). The test involves
accumulation of evidence in the form of a log-likelihood ratio (logLR; or a proportional quantity) to a pair of terminating bounds,
which trigger acceptance of the respective hypotheses. Alan Turing developed the same algorithm as a part of his code-breaking
work in WWII (Gold and Shadlen, 2002; Good, 1979). A decade later, several psychologists recognized the implications for choice
and reaction time (RT) (e.g., Laming, 1968; Stone, 1960). However, the field realized that thismodel predicts that for a fixed stimulus
strength (e.g., 12% coherent motion), the mean RT for correct and erroneous choices should be identical. In fact, the distributions
should be scaled replicas of one another. This prediction was clearly incorrect. In experiments like the ones described in this essay,
errors are typically slower, and the apparent refutation led the field to abandon themodel. A few stubborn individuals stuck with the
bounded accumulation framework (e.g., Stephen Link and Roger Ratcliff), but there was little enthusiasm from the community of
psychophysics and almost no penetration into neuroscience.
It turns out that the prediction was misguided. There is no reason to assume the terminating bounds are flat (i.e., constant as a
function of elapsed decision time). If the conversion of evidence to logLR is known or if the source of evidence is statistically sta-
tionary, then flat bounds are optimal in the sensementioned above. But if the reliability is not known (e.g., themotion strength varies
from trial to trial) or there is an effort cost of deliberation time (within trial), then the bounds should decline as a function of elapsed
decision time (Busemeyer and Rapoport, 1988; Drugowitsch et al., 2012; Rapoport and Burkheimer, 1971). Uncertainty about reli-
ability implies a mixture of difficulties across decisions (i.e., experimental trials). Intuitively, if after many samples, the accumulated
evidence is still meandering near the neutral point, then it is likely that the source of evidence was unreliable and the probability of
making a correct decision is less likely. This leads to a normative solution to sequential sampling inwhichbounds collapse over time.
This results in slow errors simply because errors are more frequent when the bounds are lower. There are other solutions to this
dilemma (Link and Heath, 1975; Ratcliff and Rouder, 1998), but we favor the collapsing bounds because it is more consistent
with physiology (e.g., the urgency signal).
This is a cautionary tale about the application of normative theory. In this case there was amistaken assumption that a normative
model would apply more widely than the conditions of its derivation. There is also the question of what is optimized. It is also a
cautionary tale about the role of experimental refutation. Sometimes it is worthwhile to persist with a powerful idea even when
the experimental facts seem to offer a clear contradiction. If only we knew when to do this!
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the neural firing during the period of random dot viewing. The
evolution of this activity occurs in just the right time frame for
decision formation (Figure 3). Indeed, the average firing rate in
LIP approximates the integration (i.e., accumulation) of the differ-
ence between the averaged firing rates of pools of neurons in MT
whose RFs overlap the random dot motion stimulus. It is known
that the firing rate of MT neurons is approximated by a constant
plus a value that is proportional to motion strength in the
preferred direction (Britten et al., 1993). For motion in the oppo-
site direction, the response is approximated by a constant minus
a value proportional to motion strength. The difference is simply
proportional to motion strength. Interestingly, in LIP, the initial
rate of rise in the average firing rate is proportional to motion
strength (Figure 3C, inset), suggesting that the linking computa-
tion is integration with respect to time (Roitman and Shadlen,
2002; Shadlen and Newsome, 1996).
This integration step is supported directly by inserting brief
motion ‘‘pulses’’ in the display and demonstrating their lasting
effect on the LIP response, choice, and RT (Huk and Shadlen,
2005). Moreover, the signal that is integrated is noisy, giving
rise to a neural correlate of both drift and diffusion. The former
is evident in the mean firing rates of LIP, whereas the latter is
adduced from the evolving pattern of variance and autocorrela-
tion of the LIP response across trials (Churchland et al., 2011).Together, these observations make a strong case for the repre-
sentation of the integral of the sensory signal plus noise, begin-
ning200ms after onset of motion. This is a long time compared
to visual responses of neurons in MT and LIP, but remember, this
is not a visual response. The RDM is not in the response field of
the LIP neuron. The brain must establish a flow of information
such that motion in one part of the visual field bears on the
salience of a choice target in another location (Figure 3A). Below,
we refer to this operation as ‘‘circuit configuration.’’ It is one of
the mysteries we hope to understand in the next decade. It is
unlikely to be achieved by direct connections from MT to LIP.
It requires too much flexibility. Indeed, a cue at the beginning
of a trial can change the configuration of what evidence supports
what possible action. This is whywe believe that even this simple
task involves a level of function that is more similar to the flexible
operations underlying cognition than it is to the specialized pro-
cesses that support sensory processing.
Recall that the behavioral data—choice and RT—support the
idea that each decision terminates when the DV reaches a
threshold or bound. A neural correlate of this event can be
seen in the traces in Figure 3D, which shows the responses lead-
ing up to a decision in favor of the target in the response field (Tin).
The responses achieve a stereotyped level of firing rate 70–
100 ms before the eye movement. So the bound or threshold
inferred from the behavior has its neural correlate in a level ofNeuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 795
Saccade
Motion
Targets
Fixation RF
Tim
e
]RT
0 200 400 600
20
30
40
50
60
70
Time from motion onset (ms)
Fi
rin
g 
ra
te
 (s
pik
es
/s)
 0.0%
 3.2%
 6.4%
12.8%
25.6%51.2%
RT (ms)
Time from saccade (ms)
Fi
rin
g 
ra
te
 (s
pik
es
/s)
30
40
50
60
70
–1000 –500 0
−40 0 40
−0.5
0
0.5
Motion StrengthB
ui
ld
up
 ra
te
 (z
−s
co
re)
20
A B
C D
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
co
rre
ct
0 2.5 5 10 20 40
400
600
800
Motion Strength (%coh)
R
T 
(m
s)
Figure 3. Neural and Behavioral Support for
Bounded Evidence Accumulation
(A) Choice-reaction time (RT) version of the direc-
tion discrimination task. The subject views a
patch of dynamic random dots and decides the
net direction of motion. The decision is indicated
by an eye movement to a peripheral target. The
subject controls the viewing duration by termi-
nating each trial with an eye movement whenever
ready. The gray patch shows the location of
the response field (RF) of an LIP neuron. One of
the choice targets is presented in the RF. RT, re-
action time.
(B) Effect of stimulus difficulty on choice accuracy
and decision time. The solid curve in the lower
graph is a fit of the bounded accumulation model
to the reaction time data. The model can be used
to predict the monkey’s accuracy (upper graph).
The solid curve is the predicted accuracy based on
bound and sensitivity parameters derived from the
fit to the RT data.
(C) Response of LIP neurons during decision for-
mation. Average firing rate from 54 LIP neurons is
shown for six levels of difficulty. Responses are
grouped by motion strength (color) and direction
(solid/dashed toward/away from the RF); they
include all trials, including errors. Firing rates are
aligned to onset of random-dot motion and trun-
cated at the median RT. Inset shows the rate of
rise of neural responses as a function of motion
strength. These buildup rates are calculated based
on spiking activity of individual trials 200–400 ms
after motion onset. Data points are the averaged
normalized buildup rates across cells. Positive/
negative values indicate increasing/decreasing
firing rate functions.
(D) Responses grouped by reaction time and
aligned to eye movement. Only Tin choices are
shown. Arrow shows the stereotyped firing rate
70 ms before saccade initiation.
Adapted from Roitman and Shadlen (2002).
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Perspectivefiring rate in LIP. This holds for the Tin choices, but not when the
monkey makes the other choice. The idea is that this is when
the firing rate of another population of LIP neurons—the ones
with the other choice target in their response fields—reach a
threshold.
One implication is that the bounded evidence accumulation is
better displayed as a race between two DVs, one supporting
right and the other supporting left, as mentioned earlier (Fig-
ure 2B). This is convenient because it allows the mechanism
to extend to decisions among more than two options (Bolli-
munta et al., 2012; Churchland et al., 2008; Ditterich, 2010;
Usher and McClelland, 2001). It is just a matter of expanding
the number of races. With a large number of accumulators the
system can even approximate direction estimation (Beck
et al., 2008; Furman and Wang, 2008; Jazayeri and Movshon,
2006). A race architecture also introduces some flexibility into
the way the bound height is implemented in the brain. In
behavior, when a subject works in a slow but more accurate
regime, we infer that the bound is further away from the starting
point. Envisioned as a race, the change in excursion can be
achieved by a higher bound or by a lower starting point. It
appears that the latter is more consistent with physiology
(Churchland et al., 2008).796 Neuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.A race architecture also provides a simple way to incorporate
the cost of decision time (Drugowitsch et al., 2012) or deadline
(Heitz and Schall, 2012). One might imagine decision bounds
that squeeze inwardasa functionof time, thereby lowering thecri-
terion for termination. However, the brain achieves this by adding
a time-dependent (evidence-independent) signal to the accumu-
lated evidence,whichwe refer to as an ‘‘urgency’’ signal (Church-
land et al., 2008; Cisek et al., 2009). The urgency signal adds to
the accumulated evidence in all races, bringing DVs closer
to the bound rather than bringing the bounds closer to the DVs.
The bound itself is a fixed firing rate threshold (as in Figure 3D,
see also Hanes and Schall, 1996). This suggests that the termina-
tion mechanism could be achieved with a simple threshold
crossing, unencumbered by details such as the cost of time, the
tradeoff between speed and accuracy, and other policies that
affect the decision criteria. By implementing these policies in
areas like LIP, the brain can use the same mechanism to sense
a threshold crossing yet exercise different decision criteria for
different processes. For example, it may take less accumulated
evidence to decide to look at something than to grasp or eat it.
We are suggesting that different brain modules, support-
ing different provisional intentions, can operate on the same in-
formation in parallel and apply different criteria (Shadlen et al.,
Box 3. Emerging Principles
The neurobiology of decision making has exposed features of
computation and neural processing that may be viewed as
principles of cognitive neuroscience.
d Flexibility in time. The process is not tied reflexively to
immediate changes in the environment or to the real time
demands of motor control.
d Integration. The process involves an accumulation of evi-
dence in timeor frommultiplemodalities or across spaceor
possibly across propositions (as in a directed graph).
d Probabilistic representation.Neural firing rates are asso-
ciated with a degree of belief or degree of commitment to a
proposition. This is facilitated by converting a sample of
evidence, e, to a difference between firing rates of neurons
that assign positive and negative weight to e, with respect
to a proposition (Gold and Shadlen, 2001; Shadlen et al.,
2006).
d Direct representation of a decision variable. Neurons
represent in their firing rates a combination of quantities
in a low-dimensional variable that supports a decision.
The DV greatly simplifies the process leading to commit-
ment and the certainty or confidence that the decision
will be correct.
d Continuous flow. Partial information, or an evolving deci-
sion variable, can affect downstream effector structures
despite the fact that these effectors are only brought into
play after the decision is made.
d Termination. The decision process incorporates a stop-
ping rule based on the state of evidence and/or time.
This is an operation like thresholding, applied to the DV.
d Intentional framework. The word intentional is meant to
contrast with ‘‘representational.’’ The suggestion is that in-
formation flow is not toward progressively abstract con-
cepts but is instead in the service of propositions, which
in their simplest rendering resemble affordances or provi-
sional intentions. (Cisek, 2007; Shadlen et al., 2008).
Although no action need occur, many decisions are likely
to obey an organization from the playbook of a flexible sen-
sory tomotor transformation. In one sense, this justifies the
existence of a DV in brain areas associated with directing
the gaze or a reach.
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theory: the bound is the high threshold, but it (via the starting
point) is also an adjustable criterion, which may be deployed
differently depending on policies and desiderata. As explained
later, this parallel intentional architecture lends insight into seem-
inglymysterious distinctions, such as preparationwithout aware-
ness of volition (Haggard, 2008), subliminal cuing, and noncon-
scious cognitive processing (Dehaene et al., 2006; Del Cul
et al., 2009). Put simply, too little evidence to pierce conscious-
ness might be enough information to prepare another behavior.
The key is to recognize consciousness as just another kind of
decision to engage in a certain way (Shadlen and Kiani, 2011).
To be clear, we suspect that LIP is one of many areas that
represent a DV, and it does so only because the decision before
themonkey is not ‘‘Which direction?’’ but ‘‘Which eyemovement
target?’’ Other areas are involved if the decision is about reach-
ing to a target (e.g., Pesaran et al., 2008; Scherberger and Ander-
sen, 2007) and still others, presumably, if the decision is about
whether an item is a match or nonmatch, for example (Tosoni
et al., 2008; but see Heekeren et al., 2006). This, however, will
remain a matter of speculation until a neural correlate of a DV
is demonstrated in these situations.
We place emphasis on the DV because it is a level of represen-
tation that can be dissociated from sensory processing of evi-
dence and motor planning. The DV is not the decision. It is built
from the evidence, it incorporates other signals related to value,
time, and prior probability, and it must be ‘‘read out’’ by neurons
that sense thresholds, calculate certainty, and trigger the next
step, be it a movement or another decision. The argument is
not that all decisions require long integration times but that those
that do permit insights that are otherwise difficult to attain. To
support a neural correlate of a DV, we must at least try to (1)
distinguish the response from a sensory response, (2) distinguish
it from a motor plan reflecting only the outcome of the decision,
and (3) demonstrate a correspondence with the decision pro-
cess. To achieve these we need more than tests of whether
mean responses are different under choice A versusB.Wewould
like to reconcile quantitatively the neural responsewith the DV in-
ferred from a rich analysis of behavior: error rates, reaction time
means and distributions, confidence ratings. We say try because
there are reasons we do not expect complete satisfaction on any
of these criteria. For example the motor system might reflect the
DV (Gold and Shadlen, 2000; Selen et al., 2012; Song and Na-
kayama, 2008, 2009; Spivey et al., 2005), and noisy sensory re-
sponses often bear a weak relationship to choice (Britten et al.,
1996; Nienborg and Cumming, 2009; Parker and Newsome,
1998; Uka and DeAngelis, 2004; Celebrini and Newsome, 1994;
Cook and Maunsell, 2002). Nonetheless, for the case of motion
bearing on a choice target in the response fields of LIP neurons,
the correspondence to a DV seems reasonably compelling.
Principles, Extensions, and Unknowns
Box 3 summarizes some of the principles that have arisen from a
narrow line of investigation. We would like to think that such prin-
ciples will apply more generally to many types of decisions,
including those of humans (Kayser et al., 2010; Donner et al.,
2009; Heekeren et al., 2004; O’Connell et al., 2012; Philiastides
and Sajda, 2007), and to other cognitive functions that bear noobvious connection to decision making. Of course, many princi-
ples are yet to be discovered, and even those that seem solid are
not understood at the refined circuit level that will be required to
reap the benefits of this knowledge in medicine. From here on,
we will branch outward, beginning with other types of perceptual
decisions, then decisions that are not about perception, and on
to aspects of cognition that do not at first glance appear to have
anything to do with decision making but that may benefit from
this perspective.
Other Perceptual Decisions
Visual neuroscience was poised to contribute to the neurobi-
ology of decision making because of a confluence of progress
in psychophysics (Graham, 1989), quantitative reconciliation ofNeuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 797
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Newsome, 1998), the successful application of similar quantita-
tive approaches to understanding processing in primary visual
cortex (e.g., Tolhurst et al., 1983), and emerging detailed knowl-
edge of central visual processes beyond the striate cortex
(Maunsell and Newsome, 1987). The move to more central rep-
resentations of signal plus noise led to the measurements from
Newsome et al. in the awake monkey, described above. We
also believe that the discovery of persistent neural activity in pre-
frontal and parietal association cortex (Funahashi et al., 1991;
Fuster, 1973; Fuster and Alexander, 1971; Gnadt and Andersen,
1988) was key. An obvious but fruitful step will be the advance-
ment of knowledge about other perceptual decisions, involving
other modalities.
Touch
Vernon Mountcastle spearheaded a quantitative program linking
the properties of neurons in the somatosensory system to the
psychophysics of vibrotactile sensation. The theory and the
physiology were a decade ahead of vision (Johnson, 1980a,
1980b; Mountcastle et al., 1969), but the link to decision making
did not occur until recently. The main difficulty was the reliance
on a two-interval comparison of vibration frequency that required
a representation of the first stimulus inworkingmemory. Thiswas
absent in S1. Recently, Ranulfo Romo and colleagues advanced
this paradigmby recording fromassociation areas of the prefron-
tal cortex,where there isnowcompellingevidence for a represen-
tation of the first frequency in the interstimulus interval as well as
the outcome of the decision (Romo and Salinas, 2003). There are
also hints of a representation of an evolving DV in ventral premo-
tor cortex (Hernandez et al., 2002; Romo et al., 2004), but the
period in which the decision evolves (during the second stimulus)
is brief and thus hard to differentiate from a sensory representa-
tion and decision outcome. Nonetheless, this paradigm has
taught us more about the prefrontal cortex involvement in deci-
sion making than vision, which has focused mainly on posterior
parietal cortex. Somatosensory discrimination also holds
immense promise for the study of decision making in rodents.
Texture discrimination via the whiskers has particular appeal
because it involves an active sensing component (i.e., whisking)
and integration across whiskers, hence cortical barrels and
time (e.g., Diamond et al., 2008).
Smell and Taste
This perceptual system and the experimental methods are far
better developed in rodents than in primates. The chief advan-
tage of the system is its molecular characterization based on
Axel and Buck’s discovery of the odor receptors (ORs) (Buck
and Axel, 1991) and the organization they imposed on a chemical
map in the olfactory bulb (Ressler et al., 1994; Rubin and Katz,
1999), but the system is not without its challenges. Odors are
difficult to control spatially and temporally, and despite the
elegant organization of the sensory system through the olfactory
bulb, we do not know the natural ligands for most ORs. Perhaps
the biggest drawback of the system is that it has proven difficult
to establish an integration window that is longer than a sniff
(Uchida et al., 2006). These challenges notwithstanding, we
believe olfactory decisions will allow the field to exploit the power
of molecular biology to delve deeper into refined mechanisms
underlying the principles in Box 3. Similar considerations apply798 Neuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.to gustatory decisions (Chandrashekar et al., 2006; Chen et al.,
2011; Miller and Katz, 2010). Animals naturally forage for food.
Presumably, they can be coerced to deliberate. Indeed, the
learning literature is full of experiments that can be viewed
from the perspective of perceptual decision making (e.g., Bun-
sey and Eichenbaum, 1996; Pfeiffer and Foster, 2013). It might
be argued that learning is the establishment of the conditions
under which a circuit will be activated. We speculate below
that this might be regarded as a change in circuit configuration
that is itself the outcome of a decision process.
Hearing
Signal detection theorymade its entry into psychophysics via the
auditory system, but the neurophysiology of cortex was decades
behind somatosensory and visual systems neuroscience. There
has been tremendous progress in this field over the past 10–20
years (e.g., Beitel et al., 2003; Recanzone, 2000; Zhou and
Wang, 2010), but there may be a fundamental problem that will
be difficult to overcome. It seems that there is a paucity of asso-
ciation cortex devoted to audition in old world monkeys (Por-
emba et al., 2003). Just where the intraparietal sulcus ought to
pick up auditory association areas, it vanishes to lissencephaly.
One wonders if the auditory association cortex is a late bloomer
in old world monkeys. Perhaps this is why language capacities
developed only recently in hominid evolution.
Interval Timing
We do not sense time through a sensory epithelium, but timing
is key to many aspects of behavior, especially foraging and
learning. Interval timing exhibits regularities that mimic those of
traditional sensory systems. The best known is a strong version
of Weber’s law (i.e., the just noticeable difference is proportional
to the baseline for comparison) known as scalar timing (Gallistel
and Gibbon, 2000; Gibbon et al., 1997). In our experience, ani-
mals learn temporal contingencies far more quickly than they
learn the kinds of visual tasks we employ in our studies. Among
the first things an animal knows about its environment are the
temporal expectations associated with a strategy. Of all the
‘‘senses’’ mentioned, interval timing may be the easiest to train
an animal on. There are challenges, to be sure, since time is
not represented the way vision or olfaction is. But it is repre-
sented in the form of an anticipation (or hazard) function by the
same types of neurons that represent a DV (Leon and Shadlen,
2003; Janssen and Shadlen, 2005), and we suspect that these
types of operations are a ubiquitous feature of the association
cortex. It is the price it pays for freedom from the immediacy of
sensation and action. Deciding when is as important as deciding
whether. Interestingly, it has been proposed that deciding when
can be explained by a bounded accumulation mechanism like
the one in Figure 2A (Simen et al., 2011).
Beyond Perceptual Decisions
Obviously, not all decisions revolve around perception. This sec-
tion serves a dual purpose: (1) to extend and amend principles
that arise in other types of decisions that have been studied in
neurophysiology and (2) to examine a few cognitive processes
from the perspective of decision making.
Value-Based and Social Decisions
An open question is whether the neural mechanisms underlying
perceptual decisions are similar to those involving decisions
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Value-based decisions involve choices among goods, money,
food, and punishments. Social decisions involve mating,
fighting, sharing, and establishing dominance. Both incorporate
evidence (e.g., what is the valence of the juice or what is my rival
about to do), but the process underlying these assessments is
not the focus, because this is typically the easy part of the prob-
lem—analogous to an easy perceptual decision (Deaner et al.,
2005; Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Rorie et al., 2010; Padoa-
Schioppa, 2011). As we pointed out earlier in the essay, value
has been integrated into signal detection theory and all mathe-
matical formalisms of decision theory in economics. We would
like to focus on one issue that might distinguish value-based
and social decision making from perceptual decision making. It
concerns an almost philosophical issue about randomness in
behavior.
It is common to model many social decisions as competitive
games. This has led to the concept of a premium on being unpre-
dictable. If this is correct, then social decisions differ fundamen-
tally from perceptual decisions, because the former embraces a
decision rule that is effectively a consultation with a random
number generator. Consider a binary choice and imagine that
the brain has accumulated evidence that renders one choice
better than the other with probability 0.7. According to some
game-theoretic approaches, the agent should choose that
option probabilistically as if flipping a weighted coin that will
come up heads with probability 0.7 (Barraclough et al., 2004;
Glimcher, 2005; Karlsson et al., 2012; Lau and Glimcher, 2005;
Sugrue et al., 2005) (but see Krajbich et al., 2012; Webb, 2013).
This way of thinking is antithetical to the way we think about
the variation in choice in perceptual decisions. Such variation
arises because the evidence is noisy. In the discussion of cer-
tainty (above), we pointed out that a DV is associated with a
probability or degree of belief, but the decision rule is itself deter-
ministic. For example, suppose that in the RDM task, on some
trial, the DV is positive (meaning favoring rightward) and happens
to correspond to p = 0.7 that the rightward choice is correct. The
decision is not rendered via consultation with a random number
generator to match the probability 0.7. The stochastic variation
(across repetitions) arises by selection of the best option in
each instance. The variation is explained by signal-to-noise
considerations on an otherwise deterministic mechanism. Put
another way, suppose that amonkey actually achieves 70% cor-
rect rightward choices on 100 trials of a weak rightward RDM
display. The job of the neuroscientist is to explain why the DV
is on the wrong side of the choice criterion on 30% of trials.
This requires reconciliation of evidence strength, noise, and
biases owing to asymmetric values placed on the options. The
assumption that the decision process is itself random—that is,
beyond the inescapable noise—could lead to incorrect conclu-
sions about value and cost. For example, it would nullify a divi-
dend for exploration, which comes for free by flipping a weighted
coin (or applying the popular ‘‘softmax’’ operation) (Daw et al.,
2006).
Probabilistic Reasoning
Humans and monkeys can learn complex reasoning that in-
volves probabilistic cues. For example, in a version of the
weather prediction task (Knowlton et al., 1996, 1994) a monkeyviews a sequence of probabilistic cues (ten possible shapes)
that bear on an outcome, analogous to rain and sunshine. The
monkey then decides which is the better choice (Yang and Shad-
len, 2007). Behaviorally, the monkeys seem to reason rationally
by assigning weights proportional to the log likelihood that a
cue would support one choice or another. The strategy reduces
the inference process to the integration of evidence in appro-
priate units. Interestingly, the firing rates of parietal neurons
represent this accumulation of evidence in units proportional to
log-likelihood ratio (logLR ) (movies of neural responses during
this task can be viewed online at http://www.nature.com/
nature/journal/v447/n7148/suppinfo/nature05852.html). We do
not know how this occurs, but it must involve learning to asso-
ciate each cue (shape) with an intensity or weight. As in the
RDM task, the capacity of the brain to accumulate evidence in
units of logLR could serve as a basis of rationality. Note the
connection to the confidence map (Figure 2C). The firing rates
of neurons in the association cortex represent—through addi-
tion, subtraction, and accumulation—a degree of belief in a
proposition. We would like to think that this principle will apply
more generally to neural computations in association cortex
(Box 3).
Memory Retrieval
In Box 2, we mentioned that Roger Ratcliff effectively saved
bounded evidence accumulation (or bounded drift diffusion)
from the dustbin. Interestingly, his efforts focused largely on lex-
ical decisions involving memory retrieval (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff
and McKoon, 1982). It is intriguing that the speed and accuracy
of memory retrieval would appear to be explained by a process
resembling the bounded accumulation of evidence bearing on a
perceptual decision. Without taking the analogy too literally, the
observation suggests that there is a sequential character to the
memory retrieval. Perhaps the ‘‘a-ha’’ moment of remembering
involves a commitment to a proposition based on accumulated
evidence for similitude. Related ideas have been promoted by
memory researchers investigating the role of the striatum in
memory retrieval (e.g., Donaldson et al., 2010; Schwarze et al.,
2013; Scimeca and Badre, 2012; Wagner et al., 2005). This is
intriguing since the striatum is suspected to play protean roles
in perceptual decision making too: value representation, time
costs, bound setting, and termination (Bogacz and Gurney,
2007; Ding and Gold, 2010, 2012; Lo and Wang, 2006; Malapani
et al., 1998). Of course, memory retrieval is the source of evi-
dence in most decisions that are not based on evidence from
perception. The process could impose a sequential character
to the evidence samples that guide the complex decisions that
humans make (Gigue`re and Love, 2013; Wimmer and Shohamy,
2012). If so, integrating these fields of study might permit exper-
imental tests of the broad thesis of this essay—that the principles
and mechanisms of simple perceptual decisions also support
complex cognitive functions of humans.
Finally, one cannot help but wonder: if memory retrieval re-
sembles a perceptual decision, perhaps we should view storage
as a strategy to encode degree of similitude so that the recall
process can choose correctly—where choice is activation of a
circuit and its accompanying certainty. For example, the assign-
ment of similitude might resemble the process that we exploited
in Yang’s study of probabilistic reasoning (see above). RecallNeuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 799
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shapes. Each time a shape appeared, it triggered the incorpora-
tion of a weight into a DV. That is, the shape activated a parietal
circuit that assembles evidence for a hypothesis. Perhaps some-
thing like this happens when we retrieve a memory. The cue to
the memory is effectively the context that establishes a ‘‘related-
ness’’ hypothesis, analogous to the choice targets in Yang’s
study. Instead of reacting to visual shapes to introduce weights
to the DV, the context triggers a directed search, analogous to
foraging, such that each step introduces weights that increment
and decrement a DV bearing on similitude. As in foraging, mini-
decisions are made about the success or failure of the search
strategy and a decision is made to explore elsewhere or deeper
in the tree.
Viewing the retrieval process as a series of decisions about
similitude invites us to speculate that what is stored, consoli-
dated, and reconsolidated in memory is not a connection but
values like those associated with the shapes in the Yang study:
a context-dependent value—a weight of evidence as opposed
to a synaptic weight—bearing on a decision about relevance.
We recognize that this is embarrassingly vague, but we hope
more serious scholars of learning and memory will perceive
some value in the decision-making perspective.
Strategy and Abstraction
When we make a decision about a proposition but we do not
know how we will communicate or act upon that decision, then
structures like LIP are unlikely sites of integration, and a DV is un-
likely to ‘‘flow’’ to brain structures involved in motor preparation
(Gold and Shadlen, 2003; Selen et al., 2012). Such abstract
decisions are likely to use similar mechanisms of bounded evi-
dence accumulation and so forth (e.g., see O’Connell et al.,
2012), but there is much work to be done on this. In a sense an
abstract decision about motion is a decision about rule or
context. For example, if a monkey learns to make an abstract
decision about direction, it must know that ultimately it will be
asked to provide the answer somehow, for example by indi-
cating with a color, as in red for right, green for left. The idea is
that during deliberation, there is accumulation of evidence
bearing not on an action but on a choice of rule: when the oppor-
tunity arises, choose red or green (Shadlen et al., 2008).
There are already relevant studies in the primate that suggest
rule is represented in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (e.g.,
Wallis et al., 2001). A rule must be translated to the activation,
selection, and configuration of another circuit. In the future, it
would be beneficial to elaborate such tasks so that the decision
about which rule requires deliberation. Were it extended in time,
we predict that a DV (about rule) would be represented in struc-
tures that effect the implementation of the rule.
More generally, we see great potential in the idea that the
outcome of a decision may not be an action but the initiation
of another decision process. It invites us to view the kind of stra-
tegizing apparent in animal foraging as a rudimentary basis for
creativity—that is, noncapricious exploration within a context
with overarching goals—and it allows us to appreciate why
larger brains support the complexity of human cognition. With
a bigger brain comes the ability to make decisions about deci-
sions about decisions. Pat Goldman-Rakic (Goldman-Rakic,
1996) made a similar argument, as has John Duncan under800 Neuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.the theme of a multiple demands system (Duncan, 2013; see
also Botvinick et al., 2009; Badre and D’Esposito, 2009; Miller
et al., 1960). We suspect that this nested architecture will
displace the concept of a global workspace (Baars, 1988; Ser-
gent and Dehaene, 2004), which currently seems necessary to
explain abstract ideation.
Decisions about Relevance
Most decisions we make do not depend on just one stream of
data. The brain must have a way to allow some sources of infor-
mation to access the decision variable and to filter out others.
These might be called decisions about relevance. It is a reason-
able way to construe the process of attention allocation, and we
have already mentioned a potential role in decisions based on
evidence from memory. The outcome of a ‘‘decision about rele-
vance’’ is not an action but a change in the routing of information
in the brain. Norman and Shallice (Norman and Shallice, 1986;
Power and Petersen, 2013) referred to this as controlling (in
contrast with processing). For neurophysiology, we might term
this circuit selection and configuration. We suspect its neural
substrate is a yet-to-be-discovered function of supragranular
cortex, and it is enticing to think that it has a signature in neural
signals that can be dissociated from modulation of spike rate.
Examples include field potentials, the fMRI BOLD signal, and
phenomena observed with voltage-sensitive dyes.
Decisions to Move or Engage: Volition and
Consciousness
We have gradually meandered to the territory of cognitive func-
tions, which at first glance do not resemble decisions. The idea is
that we might approach some of the more mysterious functions
from a vantage point of decision making. The potential dividend
is that the mechanisms identified in the study of decision making
might advance our understanding of some seemingly elusive
phenomena.
Consider the problem of volition: the conscious will to perform
an action. Like movements made without much awareness,
specification and initiation of willful action probably involve the
accumulation of evidence bearing on what to do along with a
termination rule that combines thresholds in time (i.e., a deadline)
and evidence. What about the sensation of ‘‘willing’’? We
conceive of this as another decision process that uses the
same evidence to commit to some kind of internal report—or
an explicit report if that is what we are asked to supply. It should
come as no surprise that this commitment would require less
evidence than the decision to actually act, but it is based on a
DV determining specification and initiation. Thus we should not
be shocked by the observation that brain activity precedes
‘‘willing,’’ which precedes the actual act (Haggard, 2008; Libet
et al., 1983; Roskies, 2010). Of course, if an actor is not engaging
the question about ‘‘willing,’’ the threshold for committing to
such a provisional report might not be reached before an action,
in which case we have action without explicit willing. Finally,
since it is possible to revise a decision with information available
after an initial choice (Resulaj et al., 2009), we can imagine that
the second scenario could support endorsement of ‘‘willing’’
after the fact. Nothing we have speculated seems terribly contro-
versial. Viewed from the perspective of decision making, willing,
initiating, preparing subliminally, and endorsing do not seem
mysterious.
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grail of psychology and neuroscience—is explained as a deci-
sion to engage in a certain way. When a neurologist assesses
consciousness, she is concerned with a spectrum of wakeful-
ness spanning coma through stupor though full attentive
engagement. The transition from sleep to wakefulness involves
a kind of decision to engage—to do so for the cry of the baby
but not the sound of the rain or the traffic. These are perceptual
decisions that result in turning on the circuitry that wakes us—
circuitry that involves brainstem, ascending systems, and intra-
laminar nuclei of the thalamus. Of course, this is not the kind of
consciousness that fascinates psychologists and philosophers.
But it may be related. We have already suggested that the
outcome of a decision may be the selection and configuration
(or parameterization) of another circuit. We do not understand
these steps, but we speculate that they involve similar thalamic
circuitry. Indeed, the association thalamic nuclei (e.g., pulvinar)
contain a class of neurons that exhibit projection patterns (and
other features) that resemble the neurons in the intralaminar
nuclei. Ted Jones referred to this as the thalamic matrix (Jones,
2001). These matrix neurons could function to translate the
outcome of one decision to the ‘‘engagement’’ of another circuit.
Such a mechanism is probably a ubiquitous feature of cogni-
tion, and we assume it does not require the kind of conscious
awareness referred to as a holy grail. We do not need conscious
awareness to make a provisional decision to eat, return later,
explore elsewhere, reach for, court, or inspect. But when we
decide to engage in the manner of a provisional report—to
another agent or to oneself—we introduce narrative and a form
of subjectivity. Consider the spatiality of an object that I decide
to provisionally report to another agent. The object is not a pro-
visional affordance—something that has spatiality as an object I
might look at, or grasp in a certain way, or sit upon—but instead
occupies a spatiality shared by me and another agent (about
whom I have a theory of mind). It has a presence independent
of my own gaze perspective. For example, it has a back that I
cannot see but that can be seen (inspected) by another agent,
or by me if I move. This example serves as a partial account of
what is commonly referred to as qualia or the so-called hard
problem. But it is no harder than an affordance—a quality of an
object that would satisfy an action like sitting on or looking at.
It only seems hard if one is wed to the idea that representation
is sufficient for perception, which is obviously false (Churchland
et al., 1994; Rensink, 2000).
Viewed as a decision to engage, the problem of conscious
awareness is not solved but tamed. The neural mechanisms
are not all that mysterious. They involve the elements of decision
making and probably co-opt the mechanisms of arousal from
sleep. This is speculative to be sure, but it is also liberating,
and we hope it will inspire experiments.
Toward a More Refined Understanding
The broad scope of decision making belies a more significant
impact, for we believe that principles revealed through the study
of decision making expose mechanisms that underlie many of
the core functions of cognition. This is because the neural mech-
anisms that support integration, bound setting, initiation, and
termination, and so forth are mechanisms that keep the normalbrain ‘‘not confused.’’ We suspect that a breakdown of these
mechanisms not only leads to confusion but also to diverse
manifestation of cognitive dysfunction, depending on the nature
of the failure and the particular brain system that is compro-
mised. It seems conceivable that in the next 25 years, we will
know enough about these mechanisms to begin to devise ther-
apies to correct or ameliorate such dysfunction and possibly
even reverse it. These therapies will target circuits in ways we
cannot imagine right now, because we lack the refined under-
standing of neural mechanism at the appropriate level.
The findings reviewed in this essay afford insight into mecha-
nisms at a systems and computational level. We might begin our
steps toward refinement by listing three open questions about
the decision process described in the beginning of this essay.
(1) LIP neurons represent the integral of evidence but we do
not know how the integration occurs or whether LIP plays an
essential role. (2) The coalescence of firing rate before Tin
choices suggests that the mechanism for termination is a
threshold or bound crossing, but we do not know where in the
brain the comparison is made, how it is made, or how the bound
is set. We think the bound is downstream of LIP, and when it is,
integration stops, but we do not know how a threshold detection
leads to a change in the state of the LIP circuit. We also do not
know what starts the integration. There’s a reproducible starting
time200 ms after the onset of motion, but we do not know why
this is so long and what is taking place in the 100+ ms between
the onset of relevant directional signals in visual cortex and their
representation in LIP. (3) We do not know how values are added
to the integral of the evidence. We’re fairly certain that time-
dependent quantities, such as the urgency signal mentioned
earlier or a dynamic bias signal (Hanks et al., 2011), are added,
but we do not knowwhether they are represented independently
of the DV and how they are incorporated into the DV.
The answers to these questions will require the study of neural
processing in other cortical and subcortical structures, including
the thalamus, basal ganglia, and possibly the cerebellum. It
makes little sense to say the decision takes place in area LIP,
or any other area for that matter. Even for the part of the decision
processwith which LIP aligns—representation of a DV—it seems
unlikely that the pieces of the computation arise de novo in LIP.
Still, it will be important to determine which aspects of the cir-
cuitry play critical roles.
Perhaps the most important problem to solve is the mecha-
nism of integration. It is commonly assumed that this capacity
is an extension of a simpler capacity of neurons to achieve a
steady persistent activity for tenths of seconds to seconds
(Wang, 2002), but this remains an open question. There are
several elegant computational theories that would explain inte-
gration by balancing recurrent excitation with leaks and inhibition
(Albantakis and Deco, 2009; Bogacz et al., 2006; Machens et al.,
2005; Miller and Katz, 2013; Usher and McClelland, 2001; Wong
and Wang, 2006) along with a variety of extensions that over-
come sensitivity to mistuning (Cain et al., 2013; Goldman et al.,
2003; Koulakov et al., 2002). These theories would support inte-
gration within the cortical module (e.g., LIP). In contrast, our
favorite idea for integration would involve control signals that
effectively switch the LIP circuit between modes that either
defend the current firing rate (i.e., stable persistent activity) orNeuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 801
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from the visual cortex. A similar idea has been put forth by Schall
and colleagues (Purcell et al., 2010). This is part of the larger idea
mentioned in the section on decisions about relevance. The
result of this decision is a change in configuration of the LIP cir-
cuit such that the new piece of evidence can perturb the DV.
To begin to address the circuit-level analyses of integration we
need better techniques that can be used in primates andweneed
better testing paradigms in rodents. There is great promise in
both of these areas and emerging enthusiasm for interaction
between these traditionally separate cultures.Weneed to control
elements of the microcircuit in primates with optogenetics and
DREADD (designer receptors exclusively activated by designer
drugs, Rogan and Roth, 2011) technologies, and we need to
identify relevant physiological properties of cortical circuits in
more tractable animals (e.g., the mouse) that can be studied in
detail. Ideally, the variety, reliability, and safety of viral expression
systems will support such work in highly trained monkeys (e.g.,
Diester et al., 2011; Han et al., 2009; Jazayeri et al., 2012), and
the behavioral paradigms in mice will achieve the sensitivity to
serve as assays for subtle manipulations of the circuit. Recall
that the most compelling microstimulation studies in the field of
perceptual decision making (e.g., Salzman et al., 1990) would
have failed had the task included only easy conditions! Promising
work fromseveral labs supports the possibility of achieving this in
rats (e.g., Brunton et al., 2013; Lima et al., 2009; Raposo et al.,
2012; Rinberg et al., 2006; Znamenskiy and Zador, 2013), and
mice cannot be far behind (Carandini and Churchland, 2013).
Indeed, it now appears possible to study persistent activity in
behaving mice (Harvey et al., 2012). These are early days, but
we are hopeful that the molecular tools available in the mouse
will yield answers to fundamental questions about integration
and eventually to some of the other ‘‘principles’’ listed in Box 3.
Many of the most important questions concern interactions
between circuits. What processes are responsible for gating,
routing, selecting, and configuring association areas like LIP?
Here we need technologies that will make it routine to record
from and manipulate neurons identified by their connection to
other brain structures—that is, without heroic effort (e.g., Som-
mer and Wurtz, 2006). Were it possible to record from neurons
in both the striatum and cortex that receive input from the
same dorsal pulvinar neuron, we might begin to understand
how the same LIP neuron can be influenced by different sources
of evidence in different contexts. We suspect that this con-
figuration must be realized in the 100 ms epoch in which
motion information is available in the visual cortex but not yet
apparent in LIP.
Closing Remarks
We have covered much ground in this essay, but we have only
touched on a fraction of what the topic of decisionmakingmeans
to psychologists, economists, political scientists, jurists, philos-
ophers, and artists. And despite our attempt to connect percep-
tual decision making to other types of decisions, even many
neuroscientists will be right to criticize the authors for parochi-
alism and gross omissions. Perhaps thinking about the next
quarter-century ought to begin with an acknowledgment that
the neuroscience of decision making will influence many disci-802 Neuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.plines. This is an exciting theme to contemplate as an educator
wishing to advance interdisciplinary knowledge, but it may
be wise to avoid two potential missteps. The first is to believe
that neuroscience offers more fundamental explanations of
phenomena traditionally studied by other fields. Our limited
interactions with philosophers and ethicists has taught us that
one of the hardest questions to answer is why (and how) a neuro-
scientific explanation would affect a concept. The second is to
assert that a neuroscientific explanation renders a phenomenon
quaint or unreal. A neuroscientific explanation of musical aes-
thetics does not make music less beautiful. Explaining is not
explaining away.
This is the 25th anniversary of Neuron, which invites us to think
of the neuron as the cornerstone of brain function. We see no
reason to exclude cognitive functions, like decision making,
from the party. Indeed 25 years ago, when the study of vision
began its migration from extrastriate visual cortex to the parietal
association cortex, some of us received very clear advice that
the days of connecting the firing rates of single neurons with vari-
ables of interest were behind us.Wewerewarned that the impor-
tant computations will only be revealed in complex patterns of
activity across vast populations of neurons. We were skeptical
of this advice, because we had ideas about why neurons were
noisy (so found the patterns less compelling), and believed the
noise arose from a generic problem that had to be solved by
any cortical module that operates in what we termed a ‘‘high-
input’’ regime (Shadlen and Newsome, 1998) (Box 1), and the
association cortex should be no exception. It seemed likely
that when amodule computes a quantity—even one as high level
as degree of belief in a proposition—the variables that are repre-
sented and combined would be reflected directly in the firing
rates of single neurons.
Horace Barlow referred to this property as a direct (as
opposed to distributed) code (Barlow, 1995). It is a far more pro-
found concept than a grandmother cell, for it is not about repre-
sentation (at least not solely) but concerns the intermediate steps
of neural computation. In vision, it is a legacy of Hubel and Wie-
sel, expanded and elaborated by J.A. Movshon (e.g., Movshon
et al., 1978a, 1978b) and many others. The concept seems to
be holding up to the study of decision making. No high-dimen-
sional dynamical structures needed for assembly—at least not
so far. In the next 25 years, the field will tackle problems that
encompass various levels of explanation, from molecule to
networks of circuits. But in the end, the key mechanisms that
underlie cognition are likely to be understood as computations
supported by the firing rates of neurons that relate directly to
relevant quantities of information, evidence, plans, and the steps
along the way.
Regarding decision making, we have arrived at a point where
the three pillars of choice behavior—accuracy, reaction time,
and confidence (Link, 1992; Vickers, 1979)—are reconciled by
a common neural mechanism. It has taken 25 years to achieve
this, and it will take another 25, at least, to achieve the degree
of understanding we desire at the level of cells, circuits, and
circuit-circuit interaction. It will be worth the effort. If cognition
is decision making writ large, then the window on cognition
mentioned in the title of this essay may one day be a portal to
interventions in diseases that affect the mind.
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